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Abstract 
This study investigates how the effect of employee stock ownership on financial performance may hinge on the 
diverse cultural and societal contexts of European countries. Based on agency and national culture theories, we 
hypothesize that the positive relationship between employee stock ownership and return on assets (ROA) is 
stronger in those nations with lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust. Using a multisource, time‐
lagged, large‐scale dataset of 1,741 firms from 21 countries in Europe, our multilevel, random coefficient 
modeling analysis found evidence for these hypotheses, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance and social trust 
serve as important contextual cues in predicting the linkage between employee stock ownership and financial 
performance. Our supplemental analysis with distinction between the managerial and nonmanagerial employee 
stock ownership further indicates managerial employee stock ownership has a direct positive effect on ROA. 
Although nonmanagerial employee stock ownership had a nonsignificant association with ROA, the relationship 
was positive and significant when uncertainty avoidance was low and social trust was high. This research 
contributes to the existing literature by illuminating some of the contextual influences altering the effectiveness 
of employee stock ownership. Our findings also offer practical suggestions for effectively using employee stock 
ownership. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Employee stock ownership has become an important economic phenomenon in most industrialized countries 
(Kruse, Freeman, & Blasi, 2010; Poutsma, Ligthart, & Veersma, 2006). Employees can earn stock rights through 
diverse organizational practices, such as owning stocks held by an employee ownership trust, buying stock at a 
low price via employee stock purchase plans, and receiving stock options as part of their pay. In the United 
States, the total number of employees participating in employee stock ownership plans (ESOP), the most 
common form of employee stock ownership, steadily increased from 10,230,425 in 2002 to 14,431,622 in 2015, 
which covers 11.88% of full‐time employees (National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), 2018). In Europe, 
93.5% of large companies had employee stock ownership schemes in 2017, as compared to 73.0% in 2006. 
Under such plans, 7,506,827 European employees owned 389 billion Euros of stock in the firms they worked for 
in 2017 (European Federation of Employee Share Ownership [EFES], 2017). 
Corresponding to its prevalence over the globe, considerable research has examined the effects of employee 
stock ownership (i.e., the degree to which employees own their firm's stock) on firm performance over recent 
decades. However, significant challenges remain in this field, and one of the key limitations is inconsistent 
results. Although prior meta‐analytic studies (e.g., Doucouliagos, 1995; O'Boyle, Patel, & Gonzalez‐Mulé, 2016) 
have indicated that firms can improve their performance with employee stock ownership, the effect sizes 
reported in those studies were weak (e.g.,  = 0.04 in O'Boyle et al., 2016). Other empirical studies (e.g., E. Kim & 
Ouimet, 2014; Poulain‐Rehm & Lepers, 2013) have often reported negative or null findings. In an effort to 
address this limitation, researchers have increasingly delved into the boundary conditions under which the 
performance‐enhancing effects of employee stock ownership are encouraged or discouraged. For instance, at 
the organizational level, organizational practices (e.g., employee participation, empowerment) and contexts 
(e.g., trustworthy climate, span of control) alter the effectiveness of employee stock ownership (Blasi, Freeman, 
& Kruse, 2016; A. M. Robinson & Wilson, 2006). At the country level, institutional contexts such as 
(de)centralization of pay determination and collective bargaining coverage affect the adoption (Croucher, 
Brookes, Wood, & Brewster, 2010; Kalmi, Pendleton, & Poutsma, 2012) and the effectiveness (Williams, 2018) of 
employee stock ownership. Although these initial studies have directed scholarly attention to the boundary 
conditions for the effectiveness of employee stock ownership, this nascent area still demands more 
investigations of the diverse aspects of internal and external organizational circumstances (Carberry, 2011). 
Following this emerging contextual view, this study delves into the role of cultural contexts in predicting the 
linkage between employee stock ownership and financial performance. Specifically, drawing on national culture 
theory, which posits that country‐level cultural norms and beliefs are powerful forces shaping people's 
perceptions, dispositions, and behaviors (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), we 
suggest that the firm‐level relationship between employee stock ownership and financial performance will be 
stronger in those countries with lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust. Our focus on these points 
among others is based on the theoretically derived constraints that hinder the effectiveness of employee stock 
ownership in the existing literature. That is, it has long been known that the restricted effectiveness of employee 
stock ownership is attributable to several factors (Pendleton & Robinson, 2010) such as risk taking 
(Sanders, 2001) and shirking of stockholders (Blair, Kruse, & Blasi, 2000; for a review, see Kaarsemaker, 
Pendleton, & Poutsma, 2010). Taking into account these dark sides, we regard uncertainty avoidance and social 
trust as country‐level contexts that may motivate or demotivate a workforce entirely from employee stock 
ownership to contribute to financial performance. Our theoretical model, depicted in Figure 1, was tested by a 
multisource, time‐lagged large‐scale dataset of 1,741 large listed firms from 21 European countries. 
 
Figure 1. Research model 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Impact of employee stock ownership on financial performance 
Agency theory has been widely used to understand how and why employee stock ownership positively affects 
firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sanders, 2001). The agency theory involves two parties engaged in a 
relationship wherein the principals (e.g., shareholders) delegate work to the agents (e.g., managers and 
employees) on their behalf (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In this relationship, agents' risk aversion and opportunism 
are two of the most important contributors to agency costs. Due to their risk aversion and self‐interest, agents 
cannot be relied upon to sacrifice their own self‐interest and behave in a manner consistent with the best 
interest of the principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Instead, agents' self‐serving behavior may result in agency 
problems such as shirking, perquisites consumption, and other opportunistic behaviors (Bethel & 
Liebeskind, 1993; Gibbs, 1993; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Wright & 
Ferris, 1997). Hence, agency theorists have highlighted the role of incentive schemes in addressing such agency 
costs (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In accordance with the core principles of agency theory, employee stock ownership, in which a portion of 
employee income is tied directly to firm profitability, has been known to suppress self‐centered behaviors in the 
workforce (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999) by mitigating 
employees' tendency to underinvest in firm‐specific human capital (Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009) as well as 
making employees' risk preferences similar to those of other shareholders (e.g., firm owners; Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994). In addition to the economic view of agency theory, employee stock ownership yields psychological 
effects such as employees' sense of ownership (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991) and identification with 
organizational goals (Buchko, 1992, 1993; French & Rosenstein, 1984; Klein, 1987; Kruse et al., 2010; 
Long, 1980), which elicit productive behavior from the workforce and ultimately lead to better firm 
performance. In this vein, past studies have largely reported a positive link between employee stock ownership 
and financial performance. For example, Blasi, Conte, and Kruse (1996) found firms with more than 5% 
employee stock ownership achieved a higher growth of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
profit margin than companies that did not. Stretcher, Henry, and Kavanaugh (2006) also demonstrated that 
firms with ESOP had a 5.5% higher ROA than those without ESOP companies. Recently, the meta‐analytic review 
by O'Boyle et al. (2016) confirmed employee stock ownership had a small but significantly positive relationship 
with firm performance (  = .04). 
In line with these theoretical arguments and empirical findings, our investigation departs from the positive 
relationship between employee stock ownership and financial performance. It is worthwhile retesting this link 
given the inconclusive and U.S.‐based results in the literature. For example, Poulain‐Rehm and Lepers (2013) 
found employee stock ownership is negatively related to financial performance in 163 French firms. Taking into 
account that the unexpected results might be attributed to cultural differences between France in their research 
and the United States in most prior research, the authors called for more studies testing the impact of employee 
stock ownership on firm performance in non‐U.S. countries, which is timely because 66.7% of empirical studies 
included in the meta‐analytic review by O'Boyle et al. (2016) were drawn from U.S. samples. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: Employee stock ownership is positively related to financial performance in European countries. 
2.2 Country‐level moderators on the effectiveness of employee stock ownership 
Country‐level differences serve as significant boundary conditions in predicting variation in the effectiveness of 
organizational practices across diverse cultural and societal contexts (Jiang, Colakoglu, Lepak, Blasi, & 
Kruse, 2015; Rabl, Jayasinghe, Gerhart, & Kühlmann, 2014). According to national culture theory, culture is 
defined as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 6) and as a multidimensional construct representing unique patterns of 
cultural values across countries (Hofstede et al., 2010). While Hofstede (1980) initially identified four cultural 
dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism–collectivism, and masculinity–femininity), 
subsequent studies have agreed there are many other cultural values, beliefs, and norms and thus have 
encouraged researchers to explore those beyond the seminal work by Hofstede (Beugelsdijk, Kostova, & 
Roth, 2017; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006, 2017; Leung & Morris, 2015). In addition, national culture has been 
conceptualized as a shared property of individuals within countries at the national level (Hofstede, 2001). 
Cultural values can vary across individuals within countries (i.e., within‐country variation; Steel & Taras, 2010) 
because individual cultural values are determined by their country's culture as well as their own characteristics 
(Chao & Moon, 2005). However, from a multilevel perspective, cultural values at the national level are an 
emergent phenomenon resulting from common values, meanings, and norms (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) 
advocated by a majority of individuals in general. 
Taking into account the between‐country differences of cultural values (Hofstede et al., 2010; House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Steenkamp, 2001), we attempt to identify some of 
the national contexts that may influence the work motivation of employees in an aggregate form under 
employee stock ownership. From a cross‐cultural management perspective, it is vital to examine how the 
national‐level contexts interact with organizational practices to predict firm‐level processes or outcomes 
(Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007). In a similar vein, cultural and societal contexts are key factors in understanding 
the adoption and the effectiveness of compensation practices (Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998; Townsend, Scott, & 
Markham, 1990) and ownership decisions (Hennart & Larimo, 1998) because they are likely to affect how 
employees react to their compensation practices (Gerhart & Fang, 2015) and thereby their work outcomes 
(Caramelli & Briole, 2007; Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 1995; Newman & Nollen, 1996). Given that employee stock 
ownership can engender the risk aversion and free‐riding problems of a workforce, which potentially hinder its 
effectiveness, we propose that country‐level differences in terms of uncertainty avoidance and social trust will 
determine the effect of employee stock ownership on financial performance. 
2.3 Uncertainty avoidance 
Using survey data collected from IBM employees from 40 countries, Hofstede (1980) identified uncertainty 
avoidance as an important cultural difference. Analyzing a sample of 17,730 managers from 951 organizations in 
62 countries, the Global Leader and Organizational Effectiveness (GLOBE) survey further verified that 
uncertainty avoidance is an essential social construct that varies across countries (House et al., 2004). 
Uncertainty avoidance denotes the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel either 
uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations (Hofstede, 2001). In a country with a high uncertainty 
avoidance culture, people generally have low tolerance for uncertainty and are driven to avoid risky situations. 
In contrast, in a low uncertainty avoidance culture, people generally have a high tolerance for ambiguity and 
take greater risks (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
We suggest that country‐level uncertainty avoidance is an important moderator for the firm‐level relationship 
between employee stock ownership and financial performance. In general, employees are likely to perceive that 
stock‐based compensation practices are risky because they have to invest an amount of their financial capital in 
their company in which they have already invested their human capital (Caramelli & Briole, 2007). Moreover, it 
is uncertain whether their work outcomes enhance firm profitability and eventually lead to increased stock price 
because these distal firm‐level outcomes are a function of a myriad of causes influenced by each employee's 
work effort, management capability, and other exogenous factors. Thus, the perceived degree of risk associated 
with stock holding can hamper the incentive effect of stock ownership (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Bloom & 
Milkovich, 1998; Gray & Cannella, 1997), because people consider both risk and return when making investment 
decisions (Ganzach, 2000; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). For example, if an employee perceives that the risks 
associated with employee stock ownership are greater than the expected return, the employee may refuse to 
reduce agency costs “by withholding effort or taking evasive actions,” and this reaction can be detrimental to 
firm profitability (Miller, Wiseman, & Gomez‐Mejia, 2002, p. 746). 
This argument can be more pronounced for firms in countries with a high level of uncertainty avoidance. 
Although employee stock ownership provides employees with the same level of incentives to behave in 
accordance with the interests of the shareholders, people in a high uncertainty‐avoidance culture may perceive 
a higher risk for employee stock ownership because they generally have low tolerance for uncertainty (Furnham 
& Ribchester, 1995; Hofstede et al., 2010). Consequently, employees working for firms in high uncertainty‐
avoidance cultures may tend to be less motivated by their wealth creation opportunities under employee stock 
ownership, and the less‐motivated workforce may negatively affect financial performance. However, the 
workforce of firms in countries with a low level of uncertainty avoidance may suffer less from the same 
problems because employees in those contexts are largely driven to perceive that uncertain situations are 
desirable, challenging, and interesting (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995; Hofstede et al., 2010). Indeed, Debus, 
Probst, König, and Kleinmann (2012) found uncertainty in the workplace (i.e., job insecurity) had a less 
detrimental effect on employee outcomes in countries with a low uncertainty‐avoidance culture. As such, the 
incentive and motivational effects of employee stock ownership are more likely to be fully activated among 
employees working for firms in low uncertainty‐avoidance cultures and thereby better channel their work 
efforts into financial performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Country‐level uncertainty avoidance moderates the relationship between employee stock 
ownership and financial performance so that the relationship is more positive in countries characterized by low 
uncertainty avoidance. 
2.4 Social trust 
We define social trust as the average level of generalized trust of people in a country. Generalized trust is a 
person's belief or perception that another's future action will not be detrimental to their own interest 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Madhok, 1995; S. L. Robinson, 1996). The general propensity to trust differs across individuals 
(Rotter, 1971) and there are significant differences in the average levels of generalized trust (i.e., social trust) 
across countries (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; Huff & Kelley, 2003). The literature has acknowledged that social trust 
is a valuable social resource and has an important influence on human behavior (Putnam, 2000). In particular, 
social trust can be a source of competitive advantage by reducing transaction costs such as costs of negotiation 
and the level of conflict (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). A low 
level of social trust drives people in the country to expect that others may behave opportunistically, and 
therefore, they are likely to prefer self‐interested behavior to avoid being exploited in social interactions by any 
self‐centered others (Kollock, 1994). 
We propose social trust is another important boundary condition for the effectiveness of employee stock 
ownership due to the potential threats of free riding (Blasi et al., 2016; Weitzman & Kruse, 1990). As individuals 
gain only 1/Nth (N = number of group members) of the payoff from their efforts, it is probable that free riders 
may exploit such collective working and rewarding situations by shirking, even while others exert effort to 
improve firm performance. To deal with shirking, some employees may step up and monitor their coworkers to 
enforce the work norm (Kruse et al., 2010). In situations where the monitoring activity is impractical (i.e., large 
groups), some employees might be willing to step back to avoid being exploited by any potential free riders. 
This claim can be salient for firms in countries with a low level of social trust where employees are likely to 
expect others to behave opportunistically. Although employee stock ownership is considered vital for achieving 
principal–agent goal alignment, employees working for firms in countries where people are usually concerned 
about others' opportunistic behaviors are likely to become free riders, which can negatively affect firms' bottom 
line. In contrast, firms in countries where people typically trust each other and believe that others are 
responsible and dependable may suffer less from the same problems because their workforce is likely to be 
more committed to their roles as a principal. Indeed, Blasi et al. (2016) found firm‐level trust moderated the 
relationship between shared capitalism practices, including employee stock ownership as a subset, and firm 
performance, which underpins our claim that social trust at the country level may moderate the link between 
employee stock ownership and financial performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: Country‐level social trust moderates the relationship between employee stock ownership and 
financial performance so that the relationship is more positive in countries characterized by high social trust. 
3 METHODS 
3.1 Data 
We tested the proposed model by analyzing a multisource, time‐lagged large‐scale dataset of large publicly 
traded companies in Europe. We gathered various data from four different sources. First, the data on employee 
stock ownership were taken from the European Employee Ownership database compiled by the EFES. The EFES, 
an international nonprofit located in Brussels, was set up in 1998 with the support of the European Commission 
to promote the development of employee stock ownership in European countries. To provide information on 
these financial participation schemes across the European countries, the EFES initiated extensive data collection 
on employee stock ownership beginning in 2006. The database provides detailed information about employee 
stock ownership in the large European public companies whose market capitalization is 200 million Euros or 
more and nonlisted companies employing 100 employees or more whose employees own 50% or more of the 
firm. In 2008, for example, the survey included 2,533 companies from 29 European countries. These companies 
employed 32.4 million people in total, which is almost 30% of all European employees. Among them, 2,291 were 
publicly traded. The data are based on information produced by companies themselves in financial reports, 
which are subject to external audit. Second, ROA and other financial data on the firms were gathered from the 
Worldscope database, which contains historical financial data of publicly traded companies around the world. 
Third, country‐level uncertainty avoidance was taken from Hofstede's cultural dimensions (Hofstede et 
al., 2010). Fourth, country‐level social trust was taken from the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and 
Development (OECD) (2011) social indicators. Drawing on the data from these various sources, we constructed 
our sample of 1,741 publicly traded companies in 21 countries in 2008, which is the only year that all the data 
sources were available for this study. By employing these four sources, we were able to compile and analyze an 
objective and unique dataset. The composition of our samples is described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Uncertainty avoidance, social trust, and employee stock ownership by country 
Country Uncertainty avoidance Social trust Employee stock ownership Observations 
Austria 70 62 .08 33 
Belgium 94 69 .05 49 
Czech 74 56 .00 3 
Denmark 23 89 .03 60 
Estonia 60 72 .01 4 
Finland 59 86 .03 61 
France 86 56 .13 231 
Germany 65 61 .06 197 
Great Britain 35 69 .07 451 
Greece 112 40 .09 53 
Hungary 82 47 .01 10 
Ireland 35 56 .06 30 
Netherlands 53 80 .05 62 
Norway 50 88 .06 83 
Poland 93 47 .08 56 
Portugal 104 38 .04 22 
Slovakia 51 47 .00 3 
Slovenia 88 53 .03 12 
Spain 86 62 .04 79 
Sweden 29 84 .04 110 
Switzerland 58 74 .06 132 
Note. Uncertainty avoidance and social trust are adopted from Hofstede et al. (2010) and OECD (2011), respectively. The 
high values represent high uncertainty avoidance and high social trust. Employee stock ownership represents the mean 
proportion of stocks outstanding held by employees in the sample. 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Financial performance 
We calculated ROA as net income over total assets. ROA is a popular measure of financial performance in 
management research (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009) and appropriately represents the profitability 
of any firm in which shareholders are interested (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008). In this study, a 1‐year time‐lagged 
ROA in 2009 was used as a dependent variable to mitigate a potential simultaneity problem. 
3.2.2 Employee stock ownership 
We measured the degree to which firms implemented employee stock ownership by considering the proportion 
of stocks outstanding held by both managerial and nonmanagerial employees. This information included stocks 
held directly by employees as well as indirectly on their behalf by collective bodies (e.g., foundations, funds, and 
trusts). While stock options (e.g., Save as You Earn in the United Kingdom) were not included, stocks held via the 
exercise of such options were included in the data pool. This operationalization is commonly used in the 
literature because it reflects the level of interest alignment between employees and shareholders (Blasi et 
al., 1996; E. Kim & Ouimet, 2014; Richter & Schrader, 2017). 
3.2.3 Uncertainty avoidance 
We used the uncertainty avoidance measure (see Table 1) identified by Hofstede et al. (2010). In the cross‐
cultural management literature, researchers have typically measured the uncertainty avoidance of countries by 
applying Hofstede's cultural dimensions (Hofstede et al., 2010) or the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004). The 
GLOBE project, however, provided only 17 countries' cultural values for our particular dataset. Furthermore, the 
GLOBE survey was conducted in 2004, which had no overlap with the employee stock ownership data from EFES 
conducted since 2006. However, Hofstede et al. (2010) provided most of the countries' cultural values in our 
sample and incorporated the survey conducted in 2008. Hofstede (2001) also demonstrated the reliability and 
validity of the countries' diverse cultural value measures. A high score of uncertainty avoidance drives people in 
a particular society to feel threatened by unknown or uncertain situations. Examples of countries in our sample 
with high levels of uncertainty avoidance were Greece, Portugal, and Belgium, whereas those with low levels of 
uncertainty avoidance were Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain. 
3.2.4 Social trust 
For social trust, we used the OECD social indicator that was originally from the survey administered in 2008 
(OECD, 2011). In the survey, respondents were asked to answer the following question, “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
using a 10‐point scale with the lowest category being “can't be too careful” (1) and the highest “most people can 
be trusted” (10). The social trust index is the percentage of respondents who selected 6 or higher (OECD, 2011). 
A high score of social trust denotes that people in a particular society generally trust other people. It has been 
generally known that single‐item measures are limited (Kline, 2005) for estimating internal consistency reliability 
and validity. However, single‐item measures may be well used (Judge & Ferris, 1993) when their 
operationalization is narrow enough to indicate a precise response (Sackett & Larson Jr, 1990). Indeed, 
researchers have argued that the single‐item social trust measure validly “taps feelings about the 
trustworthiness of the generalized other” (Putnam, 2000, p. 137). As such, the measure employed in our study 
has been most widely considered in prior research that has investigated the countries' level of social trust (Knack 
& Keefer, 1997; Qu & Yang, 2015; Rao, Pearce, & Xin, 2005). Examples of countries in our sample with high levels 
of social trust were Denmark, Norway, and Finland, whereas those with low levels of social trust were Portugal, 
Greece, and Hungary. 
3.2.5 Control variables 
We controlled for several variables that might affect our hypothesized relationships between the variables of 
interest. Our set of control variables included firm size (a natural logarithm of the number of full‐time 
employees), which could affect the effectiveness of ESOP (E. Kim & Ouimet, 2014). Also, industry memberships 
(two‐digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] codes) were controlled for because industry performance tends 
to influence the average profits of firms in that industry (Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007; Zahra, 1996). We also 
included union density and capitalization to control for the institutional backgrounds of countries (Croucher et 
al., 2010; Kalmi et al., 2012; Williams, 2018). Finally, we controlled for debt ratio due to the potential differences 
in the interests of creditors and shareholders. Specifically, creditors might focus more on a firm's stability and 
survival than profitability, which then might influence that firm's corporate governance mechanism and financial 
performance (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). 
3.3 Analytical approach 
Given our theoretical model where firms were nested within focal countries, we calculated the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (1) for ROA, which appeared to be 0.01, suggesting that country explained 1% of variance 
in ROA. The results imply there might be no need to use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) because a simpler 
ordinary least squares (OLS) might be more cost effective. However, even when the proportion of the total 
variance in a dependent variable accounted for by groups is very small, scholars have recommended using HLM 
to test cross‐level interactions due to the high type II error rate (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013; 
Farmer, Van Dyne, & Kamdar, 2015; LaHuis & Ferguson, 2009; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Given our key 
hypotheses are theory‐based, cross‐level interactions rather than country‐level direct effects, we thus 
proceeded to use HLM. As a robustness test, we also conducted OLS and found the same patterns of findings as 
reported in this study. Detailed results are available upon request. HLM not only estimates model coefficients at 
each level, but it also predicts the random effects associated with each sampling unit at every level. The Level‐1 
(firm‐level) model for ROA was thus: 
ROA𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗ESO + 𝛽2𝑗FIRMSIZE + 𝛽3𝑗DEBTRATIO + 𝛽𝑥𝑗DUMMY𝑖𝑗(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗. 
whereROA𝑖𝑗  is the ROA value of firm 𝑖 in country 𝑗 and 𝛽0𝑗is the intercept. 𝛽1𝑗, 𝛽2𝑗  , 𝛽3𝑗  , and 𝛽𝑥𝑗  are regression 
coefficients for employee stock ownership, firm size, debt ratio, and the industry dummy variables, 
respectively. 𝑟𝑖𝑗  is the firm‐level error term. The Level‐2 (country‐level) model was: 
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01UA/TRUST𝑗 + 𝛾02UNION𝑗 + 𝛾02CAPITAL𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗  
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11UA/TRUST𝑗 + 𝑈1𝑗 
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝑈2𝑗  
𝛽3𝑗 = 𝛾30 + 𝑈3𝑗  
𝛽𝑥𝑗 = 𝛾𝑥0 + 𝑈𝑥𝑗, 
where 𝛽0𝑗 is the intercept of the firm‐level model, which depends on a country's uncertainty avoidance (𝑈𝐴𝑗  ), 
social trust (TRUST𝑗), union density (UNION𝑗), and capitalization (CAPITAL𝑗). 𝛽1𝑗 is the coefficient of the firm‐
level employee stock ownership, which also depends on a country's uncertainty avoidance and social 
trust. 𝑈0𝑗  , 𝑈1𝑗, 𝑈2𝑗  , 𝑈3𝑗, and 𝑈𝑥𝑗  are country‐level error terms. 
We first tested hypothesis 1 by regressing ROA on the firm‐level predictors. We then tested cross‐level 
interactions for hypotheses 2 and 3 by regressing the Level‐1 slope (i.e., the relationship between employee 
stock ownership and ROA) onto country‐level moderators (i.e., uncertainty avoidance and social trust). We 
group‐mean centered the predictors, as this process is the recommended centering approach when cross‐level 
interactions are involved (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). Finally, we performed a simple slope analysis (Aiken 
& West, 1991) to examine whether the slopes were significantly different from zero. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables in the study where the 
organizational variables were measured at Level 1 and national contexts were treated at Level 2. ROA (𝑡  +  1) 
was positively correlated with employee stock ownership (𝑟  =   .07,  𝑝  <   .05). In terms of country‐level 
variables, uncertainty avoidance was positively correlated with employee stock ownership (𝑟  =   .09,  𝑝  <   .01) 
but was not significantly correlated with ROA (𝑟  =   .01, non‐significant [n.s.]). Meanwhile, social trust was 
negatively correlated with employee stock ownership (𝑟  =   −.11,  𝑝  <   .01) but was not significantly correlated 
with ROA (𝑟  =   .00, n.s.). 
Table 2. Means, SD, and correlations among variables 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. ROA (t + 1) 2.67 11.24 
       
2. Employee stock ownership .07 .14 .07** 
      
3. Firm size (log) 8.04 1.95 .15** −.17** 
     
4. Debt ratio .27 .20 −.04* −.02 .04 
    
5. Union density 29.54 20.03 −.01 −.12** −.13** .09** 
   
6. Capitalization 60.28 43.10 .03 −.01 −.02 −.13** .18 
  
7. Uncertainty avoidance 67.00 25.11 .01 .09** .09** .06* −.45* −.20 
 
8. Social trust 63.55 15.72 .00* −.11** −.11** .01 .66** .46* −.69** 
Note. N = 1,741 observations; 21 countries. ROA: return on assets. 
** p < .01 
* p < .05. 
 
We found a relatively high and negative correlation between uncertainty avoidance and social trust (𝑟  =
 −.69,  𝑝  <   .01), which was similar to the prior research (e.g., 𝑟  =   −.68,  𝑝  <   .01 in Qu & Yang, 2015). One 
may suggest the two variables are the same wine in different bottles given the relatively high correlation. 
Although the correlation between the two variables is somewhat high, scholars have suggested they are 
conceptually distinct: uncertainty avoidance refers to how people feel (either comfortable or uncomfortable) in 
uncertain situations (Hofstede et al., 2010), whereas social trust refers to people's belief (either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy) in other people (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Due to this distinction and our aforementioned 
theoretical reasoning, although some aspects are overlapped, it is worthwhile to examine the moderating 
effects of these two variables separately. 
4.2 Testing the hypotheses 
The results of the multilevel analyses with robust standard errors (SEs) are shown in Table 3. In Model 1, only 
the control variables (i.e., firm size, debt ratio, industry dummies, union density, and capitalization) were 
included. In Model 2, uncertainty avoidance and social trust were included. None of the country‐level variables 
had a significant association with ROA. Next, we tested the main effect of employee stock ownership on 
financial performance. 
Table 3. Results of hierarchical linear modeling 
Variables ROA (t + 1)      
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept −.01 (3.02) −2.56 (3.70) −3.68 (3.91) −3.79 (3.70) −4.02 (3.84) 
Firm‐level control variables      
Firm size (log) .74** (.24) .74** (.24) .85** (.24) .86** (.24) .85** (.24) 
Debt ratio −2.76 (1.52) −2.89 (1.49) −2.86 (1.47) −2.78 (1.45) −2.85* (1.45) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country‐level control variables      
Union density .00 (.01) −.01 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) 
Capitalization .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Country‐level moderator variables      
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Social trust 
 
.04 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) 
Firm‐level independent variable      
ESO 
  
7.24* (3.03) 8.82** (1.93) 8.18** (2.73) 
Cross‐level interactions      
ESO x UA 
   
−.23** (.04) 
 
ESO x ST 
    
.27* (.13) 
−2 Log Likelihood 13,176.39 13,175.62 13,160.97 13,151.81 13,158.26 
Pseudo R2 .30 .30 .34 .35 .35 
Note. N = 1,741 observations; 21 countries. ESO: employee stock ownership; ROA: return on assets; ST: social trust; UA: 
uncertainty avoidance. 
** p < .01 
* p < .05. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive association between employee stock ownership and financial performance. As 
shown in Model 3, employee stock ownership was significantly related to subsequent ROA (𝐵  =  7.24,  𝑆𝐸  =
 3.03,  𝑝  <   .05). The addition of employee stock ownership explained significant additional variance in ROA 
(pseudo 𝑅2   =   .34, Δ𝑅2   =   .04,  𝑝  <   .01). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Hypothesis 2 expected uncertainty avoidance to exert a negative moderating effect on the positive relationship 
between employee stock ownership and ROA. As viewed in Model 4 of Table 3, the cross‐level interaction term 
between employee stock ownership and uncertainty avoidance was significantly negative (𝐵  =   −.23,  𝑆𝐸  =
 .04,  𝑝  <   .01), indicating that the positive relationship between employee stock ownership and ROA becomes 
weaker when uncertainty avoidance is higher rather than when it is low. The addition of the cross‐level 
interaction term explained significant additional variance in ROA (pseudo 𝑅2   =   .35, Δ𝑅2   =   .01,  𝑝  <   .05). 
These results provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 posited that social trust strengthens the positive relationship between employee stock ownership 
and ROA. As seen in Model 5 of Table 3, the cross‐level interaction between employee stock ownership and 
social trust was positive and significant (𝐵  =   .27,  𝑆𝐸  =   .13,  𝑝  <   .05). The addition of the cross‐level 
interaction term explained significant additional variance in ROA (pseudo 𝑅2   =   .35, Δ𝑅2   =   .01,  𝑝  <   .05). 
These results suggest that the positive relationship between employee stock ownership and ROA becomes 
stronger when social trust is higher rather than when it is low. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
To ascertain these results, we plotted the interaction effects in Figures 2 and 3, following the procedures 
suggested by Aiken and West (1991). In general, these interaction effects are plotted at one SD above and 
one SD below the mean for the independent variable. However, our independent variable (i.e., employee stock 
ownership) had a mean of .07 and a SD of .14, which makes one SD below the mean a negative. As employee 
stock ownership cannot have a negative value, we defined the low level of employee stock ownership as zero 
(.00), while the high level of employee stock ownership represents one SD above the mean (.21). 
 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of employee stock ownership and uncertainty avoidance on subsequent return on 
assets (ROA) 
 
Figure 3. Interaction effect of employee stock ownership and social trust on subsequent return on assets (ROA) 
The plots visually confirmed that a firm's ROA is positively associated with employee stock ownership. In 
addition, the slope is steeper when a firm resides in a country that has low scores on the cultural dimension of 
uncertainty avoidance, as shown in Figure 2. Specifically, the relationship between employee stock ownership 
and ROA was significantly positive when uncertainty avoidance was low (𝐵  =  14.57,  𝑆𝐸  =  2.31,  𝑝  <   .01) but 
nonsignificant when uncertainty avoidance was high (𝐵  =  3.07,  𝑆𝐸  =  1.93, n.s.). Similarly, Figure 3 shows that 
the positive association between employee stock ownership and financial performance is stronger in a country 
with a high level of social trust. The relationship between employee stock ownership and ROA was significantly 
positive when social trust was high (𝐵  =  12.40,  𝑆𝐸  =  3.79,  𝑝  <   .01), but it was nonsignificant when social 
trust was low (𝐵  =  3.96,  𝑆𝐸  =  2.89, n.s.). Taken as a whole, these results support both hypotheses 2 and 3. 
4.3 Supplemental analysis 
As our dataset consisted of large, listed companies in Europe, our findings may have been influenced by 
managerial employee owners who may have a more substantial stake than nonmanagerial employee owners. To 
address this concern, we differentiated managerial employee stock ownership (mean = .06) and nonmanagerial 
employee stock ownership (mean = .01) and then retested our hypothesized relationships with two different 
predictors. In our data, managerial (nonmanagerial) employee stock ownership is defined as the proportion of 
stocks outstanding held by executive members (nonexecutive employees). As seen in Model 3 of Table 4, we 
found managerial employee stock ownership has a significant and positive association with subsequent ROA 
(𝐵  =  6.90,  𝑆𝐸  =  2.91,  𝑝  <   .05), and we did not find the same result for nonmanagerial employee stock 
ownership (𝐵  =  7.26,  𝑆𝐸  =  5.97, n.s.). Next, we tested the moderating effects of uncertainty avoidance and 
social trust. The interaction term between managerial employee stock ownership and uncertainty avoidance 
was statistically significant (𝐵  =   −.19,  𝑆𝐸  =   .04,  𝑝  <   .01 in Model 4). However, we found a nonsignificant 
interaction effect between managerial employee stock ownership and social trust (𝐵  =   .22,  𝑆𝐸  =   .13, n.s. in 
Model 5) to affect ROA. It was indicated that nonmanagerial employee stock ownership significantly interacts 
with both uncertainty avoidance (𝐵  =   −.67,  𝑆𝐸  =   .18,  𝑝  <   .01 in Model 4) and social trust (𝐵  =
 1.02,  𝑆𝐸  =   .31,  𝑝  <   .01 in Model 5) to affect ROA. 
Table 4. Results of supplemental analysis 
Variables ROA (t + 1)      
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept −.01 (3.02) −2.56 (3.70) −3.59 (3.85) −3.84 (3.62) −4.08 (3.76) 
Firm‐level control variables      
Firm size (log) .74** (.24) .74** (.24) .85** (.24) .88** (.24) .87** (.24) 
Debt ratio −2.76 (1.52) −2.89 (1.49) −2.86 (1.48) −2.80 (1.46) −2.82* (1.48) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country‐level control variables      
Union density .00 (.01) −.01 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) 
Capitalization .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Country‐level moderator variables      
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Social trust 
 
.04 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) 
Firm‐level independent variable      
Managerial ESO 
  
6.90* (2.91) 8.26** (2.20) 7.72** (2.71) 
Nonmanagerial ESO 
  
7.26 (5.97) 6.02* (3.03) 4.93 (5.13) 
Cross‐level interactions      
Managerial ESO x UA 
   
−.19** (.04) 
 
Nonmanagerial ESO x UA 
   
−.67** (.18) 
 
Managerial ESO x ST 
    
.22 (.13) 
Nonmanagerial ESO x ST 
    
1.02** (.31) 
−2 Log Likelihood 13,176.39 13,175.62 13,162.31 13,152.46 13,158.54 
Pseudo R2 .30 .30 .34 .35 .34 
Note. N = 1,741 observations; 21 countries. ESO: employee stock ownership; ROA: return on assets; ST: social trust; UA: 
uncertainty avoidance. 
** p < .01 
* p < .05. 
 
To advance our interpretations, we plotted these interaction effects in Figures 4, 5, and 6. Simple slope analyses 
further confirmed both managerial and nonmanagerial employee stock ownership have a positive association 
with ROA in countries with low uncertainty avoidance and high social trust. 
 
Figure 4. Interaction effect of managerial employee stock ownership and uncertainty avoidance on subsequent return on 
assets (ROA) 
 
Figure 5. Interaction effect of nonmanagerial employee stock ownership and uncertainty avoidance on subsequent return 
on assets (ROA) 
 
Figure 6. Interaction effect of nonmanagerial employee stock ownership and social trust on subsequent return on assets 
(ROA) 
5 DISCUSSION 
Building on agency and contingency theories, we sought to identify some of the cultural and societal contexts 
that may alter the positive linkage between employee stock ownership and financial performance. Our 
investigation revealed lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust amplify the positive linkage between 
employee stock ownership and ROA. Albeit not hypothesized, our additional analysis found employee stock 
ownership by the management directly increases ROA and that nonmanagerial employee stock ownership 
significantly interacts with low uncertainty avoidance and high social trust to increase ROA. Our theories and 
findings offer several theoretical and practical implications for a complete understanding of the effectiveness of 
employee stock ownership. 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
The results of this study contribute to the particular realm of employee stock ownership by identifying 
uncertainty avoidance as an important country‐level context that alters the positive linkage between employee 
stock ownership and financial performance at the firm level. Although prior research has largely indicated that 
firms can financially benefit from the use of employee stock ownership (Doucouliagos, 1995; O'Boyle et 
al., 2016), that effect size was not compelling, and even negative and null effects were also occasionally 
detected (e.g., E. Kim & Ouimet, 2014; Poulain‐Rehm & Lepers, 2013). Given this inconclusive evidence in the 
literature, researchers in this field have called for more empirical studies on those contextual variables under 
which employee stock ownership increases or decreases firm performance (Carberry, 2011). Taking into account 
the financial risk imbedded in employee stock ownership, we theorized that firms in countries with low 
uncertainty avoidance are likely to financially benefit from employee stock ownership. Our findings support this 
claim by demonstrating that employee stock ownership increases the financial performance of firms operating 
their businesses in countries where uncertain situations are endured. This evidence implies that firms in a 
society with low uncertainty avoidance can improve their profitability by implementing employee stock 
ownership. Our work highlights that the fit between employee stock ownership and uncertainty avoidance does 
matter to the financial success of firms. 
Our findings on the moderation role of social trust also help clarify the variation in the existing evidence on the 
linkage between employee stock ownership and performance outcomes. We derived social trust as a clue to 
address this issue, given that researchers and practitioners are concerned about employee shirking in the 
context of collective work and incentives (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009). Social trust represents the average 
level of generalized trust among citizens in a country. While some studies have suggested employee stock 
ownership and various forms of collective incentives will activate peer monitoring and thereby suppress 
employee shirking in a collective work structure (A. Kim, Han, Blasi, & Kruse, 2015), employee shirking has 
traditionally been a key challenge for collective incentives (Alchian & Demsetz, 1996), which impedes individual 
fairness perception as well as organizational effectiveness (Freeman, Kruse, & Blasi, 2010). As we considered 
employees in countries with high social trust are less likely to be concerned about others' shirking in the 
workplace under employee stock ownership, we theorized that firms equipped with strong social trust imbued 
from their national influence are likely to experience improved ROA. We found supporting evidence, implying 
that social trust fosters a context for realizing the better performance effects of employee stock ownership. Our 
findings contribute to the employee ownership research as well as the broader compensation literature 
regarding how to reduce employee shirking (Pendleton & Robinson, 2010; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). 
Although not specifically hypothesized, our supplemental analysis to confirm the robustness of our findings 
revealed two intriguing results pertaining to the role levels of employee stock owners (see Table 4). One of them 
is that employee stock ownership for the management has a direct and positive impact on ROA, whereas 
employee stock ownership for rank‐and‐file employees does not have the same effect. This finding makes sense 
in terms of the line of sight problem, which is a major concern for any collective incentives (Gerhart et al., 2009) 
and particularly stock‐based plans (Conyon & Freeman, 2004; see Kaarsemaker et al., 2010 for a review). In 
contrast to individual incentives, collective incentive plans typically lack line of sight due to the free‐riding 
problem (Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse, & Blasi, 2007), and this issue is more severe for employee stock ownership due 
to the influences of exogenous factors on stock prices (Pendleton, 2006). As a result, if available, stock‐based 
compensation generally takes more portions of annual pay for upper managers than rank‐and‐file employees 
(Han & Kim, 2018) because it can motivate upper mangers involved in controlling the external factors 
influencing stock prices relatively more than lower level employees. When it comes to the line of sight, this 
research thus may support that employee stock ownership is effective in increasing the distal outcomes of firms 
if it is applied to upper managers. The other is that employee stock ownership for rank‐and‐file employees more 
strongly interacts with contextual factors to affect ROA than does that for the management. This evidence 
implies contextual fit does matter to employee stock ownership for nonmanagerial employees. On balance, 
these findings may conclude that stock‐based plans should be primarily given to management in general but also 
to rank‐and‐file employees in certain contexts such as lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust at the 
country level. 
Finally, this research enriches the cross‐cultural management literature by extending the theoretical lenses to 
employee stock ownership. Corresponding to the significance of country‐level contextual influences in today's 
global economy, management scholars have asked to what degree management theories and practices can be 
generalized across different cultures and to what degree new theories and research evidence need to be further 
developed based on cultural differences. In a similar vein, researchers have called for more studies that 
incorporate country‐level contextual influences into the financial participation models (Gerhart & Fang, 2015; 
Poutsma, Blasi, & Kruse, 2012). Also, the prior research (e.g., K. Y. Kim & Patel, 2017) has suggested that the 
effectiveness of employee stock ownership may also vary across different countries. In an endeavor to respond 
to this call and suggestion, we examined whether contextual influences at the national level affect the positive 
linkage between employee stock ownership and financial performance. We identified uncertainty avoidance and 
social trust as significant boundary conditions shaped at the national level, and we found lower uncertainty 
avoidance and higher social trust do promote employee stock ownership to intensify ROA. Our work is among 
the first to account for unresolved issues pertaining to cross‐national differences on the effectiveness of 
employee stock ownership and still directly tap into the interplay between certain national contextual influences 
and employee stock ownership when predicting financial performance. Investigating the cross‐level influences 
of national variables on firm functioning is of great significance in terms of advancing a systematic 
understanding of the effectiveness of managerial practices (Qu & Yang, 2015; Rabl et al., 2014). Our theories and 
findings opened up a scholarly conversation on the cross‐cultural comparison of employee stock ownership 
effectiveness. 
5.2 Practical implications 
In a global economy, an important research question is whether a managerial practice that works in one country 
(e.g., United States, United Kingdom) can work the same in other countries (e.g., France, Germany). Managerial 
practices, such as incentives, may not necessarily work the same everywhere, but instead, the outcome may 
depend on their fit with the local cultural environments (Janssens et al., 1995; Newman & Nollen, 1996). We 
specifically estimated the practical significance of the effect of employee stock ownership on financial 
performance by calculating the impact of a one‐SD increase in the use of employee stock ownership on ROA. 
With all the other variables held at their means, an increase of one SD in employee stock ownership from the 
mean was associated with a 1.01% point increase in ROA from the mean of 2.67% to 3.68%. In countries with 
low uncertainty avoidance, an increase of one SD in employee stock ownership was associated with a 2.04% 
point increase in ROA from the mean of 2.67% to 4.71%. Similarly, an increase of one SD in employee stock 
ownership was associated with a 1.74% point increase in ROA from the mean of 2.67% to 4.41% in countries 
with a high level of social trust. Our findings and estimated effect sizes can guide managers to consider cultural 
values and societal contexts in their global locations whenever they need to make a better decision regarding 
the implementation of employee stock ownership. 
5.3 Limitations and future avenues 
Our study has several limitations that future research may need to address. First, this study only examined 
uncertainty avoidance and social trust as potential country‐level moderators in the relationship between 
employee stock ownership and financial performance. Although we carefully chose those country‐level 
moderators based on agency theory and employee stock ownership literature (i.e., uncertainty avoidance and 
social trust are closely related to risk aversion and free‐riding problems, respectively), other country‐level 
differences may also be relevant. For example, European countries have different levels of support for adoption 
and diffusion of employee stock ownership. Indeed, the mean level of employee stock ownership by country in 
our sample was highest in France (0.13 in Table 1), where the government encourages collective incentive 
schemes to promote employee savings, broader distribution of wealth, and wage flexibility (Poutsma et 
al., 2006). This government support could influence not only adoption and diffusion, but also performance of 
employee stock ownership. In this sense, future studies may want to examine other institutional factors, such as 
countries' legal (e.g., common law vs. civil law), economic (e.g., varieties of capitalism), and political (e.g., 
political stability) differences. 
Second, we assigned uncertainty avoidance and social trust scores based on the country where the firm 
(headquarters) is located. However, the international character of a company can undermine the effects of 
national cultures. For example, the sample for this study may contain multinational companies (MNCs) with 
subsidiaries in other countries. Although prior research has shown MNCs transfer the home country practices 
and values to their subsidiaries (Bae, Chen, & Lawler, 1998; Ferner, 1997; Myloni, Harzing, & Mirza, 2004), they 
are also likely to be affected by the international character of the firm (e.g., cultural values of the countries 
where their subsidiaries are located). Unfortunately, we were not able to control for international character of 
the firm due to data nonavailability. We encourage future research to examine the effects of 
internationalization of the firm on the effectiveness of employee stock ownership. 
Third, we focused on only one type of organizational outcome (i.e., ROA) of employee stock ownership, due to 
our research goal and data availability. ROA is considered one of the most appropriate performance measures in 
ownership structure research as it represents the profitability of a firm in which shareholders are most 
interested (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Mehran, 1995; Richard et al., 2009; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). As 
financial performance is a distal outcome, however, there has been a growing consensus that employment 
practices drive the distal performance of firms through intermediate outcomes, such as employee attitudes and 
behaviors (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Dyer & Reeve, 1995; Guest, 1997). Indeed, empirical studies found employee 
stock ownership is positively related to employees' organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and 
information sharing and is negatively related to turnover intention, voluntary turnover, and grievance rate (Blasi 
et al., 2016; Buchko, 1993; French & Rosenstein, 1984; Klein, 1987; Long, 1980), which could ultimately influence 
organizational performance. As such, we encourage future researchers to investigate the mediating mechanism 
through which employee stock ownership affects financial performance. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Our study is among the first to systematically examine whether national level influences (i.e., uncertainty 
avoidance and social trust) yield variation in the effect of employee stock ownership on financial performance. 
Analyzing a multisource, time‐lagged large‐scale dataset of European large listed companies, we found an 
overall positive relationship between employee stock ownership and ROA. More importantly, our analysis 
substantiated that this relationship was more strongly positive for firms operating their business in counties with 
low uncertainty avoidance or high social trust. We hope the results of this research not only advance the field of 
employee stock ownership in terms of a contextual fit, but they also offer valuable practical information to 
better leverage employee stock ownership, which in turn benefits both employers and employees. 
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